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Part 1 - The Theory Explored
Recently there has been an upsurge of interest in conflict resolution theory in Latin America and
what it has to offer protracted social conflicts, particularly those involving guerrilla insurgency
as has been the case in El Salvador and Colombia. El Salvador was the scene of a bloody civil
war from 1980-1992. After an elite-led negotiations process, accords were signed between the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) and the Salvadorean government in January
1992, which means that El Salvador is now considered to be in a 'post-conflict' period. In
Colombia, although the internal conflict is not technically termed 'civil war', there has been
fighting between diverse guerrilla groups and the Colombian armed forces since the mid-1960s.
A series of elite-led negotiations for peace began in the mid-1980s, which led to negotiations
being signed with several smaller groups. 1 Nevertheless, the two largest guerrilla groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN)
remain in arms.
The focus of interest in conflict resolution theory in Latin America has revolved around how
third parties can most usefully intervene in elite-led negotiation processes, between the leadership
of warring factions.2 However, the limitations to both the Salvadorean and Colombian negotiations
and accords which have taken place up until now, show that peace does not miraculously evolve
from accords, nor can it be imposed from the top down. The implications of this for peacebuilding
are that elite-led negotiations are only one, albeit necessary, element in the construction of peace,
but that more substantive work may have to take place alongside and as an extension to these
negotiations.
This paper uses El Salvador and Colombia to help explore the limitations of conflict resolution
theory for resource-based conflicts. It is research in progress, part of a wider doctoral project.
The purpose of the paper is therefore to explore theoretical ideas and their application to the
Salvadorean and Colombian contexts, and to generate debate, not to present any definitive answers.
It is argued that conflict resolution theory needs to alter the balance of focusing around elite-led
negotiations, and that if we are ever to transform violent manifestations of conflict we must
broaden the focus of conflict resolution work to the largely ignored links between conflict, peace
and development. It is suggested that in order to do this we need to look towards development,
empowerment and peacebuilding work as necessary adjuncts to negotiations at all stages of a
conflict process. The second part of the paper grounds these theoretical ideas in reality and,
using specific examples from rural and urban Colombia, assesses the extent to which development,
empowerment and peacebuilding from 'below' are useful concepts and practices.3
Experiences in both EI Salvador and Colombia show that what can be achieved in elite-led
negotiating processes has been very lir:nj.ted.The peace process in EI Salvador has been considered
a successful example of how negotiations can bring an end to violence in a country besieged by
12 years of civil war. Indeed, aspects of the Salvadorean experience are being used as a model
for how peace processes should, be conductedjnother parts of the world. However, what most
people consider as the peace process was actually only a limited, elite-led negotiating process.
Whilst the Peace Accords which arose from negotiations in EI Salvador have undoubtedly brought
significant changes to the country in terms of military, political and judicial reform, unjust socio-
economic structures have remained intact. These have contributed to instability which means
that resorting to violence, although not in the structured form of war, is still part of Salvadorean
reality. Elite-led negotiations are necessary, since without agreement at this level work undertaken
at other levels would also prove futile. Nevertheless, they have clearly proven to be an insufficient
means of fostering more peaceful relations.
Similarly, in Colombia, accords reached in earlier elite-led negotiating processes have proven to
be very limited. They have failed to tackle fundamental issues such as judicial reform, the purging
of the armed forces and the guaranteeing of human rights. Political reform has largely been
restricted to providing spaces for a nominal participation of former insurgent leaders in both the
Constituent Assembly (Asamblea Constituyente) and in the House of Representatives (Camera
de Representantes). Socio-economic issues have largely been confined to the provision of sums
of money to each individual guerrilla, usually used to set up small businesses.
Both the Salvadorean and the Colombian experiences suggest that in order for agreements to be
reached in elite-led discussions, sacrifices had to be made. These sacrifices related both to
negotiating agendas and to the degree of participation which was possible from civil sectors
outside the elite in the negotiating process.4 In EI Salvador social sectors from the left had
difficulties participating in negotiations due to the vertical structures between the FMLN hierarchy
and its support base made up of civilians. In Colombia, civilian participation has been limited,
partly due to the lack of an environment in which human rights are respected and political spaces
for participation can be guaranteed.5 Civil sectors in both countries remain disarticulated, which
is partly a reflection of their lack of ability to impact on elite-led negotiations.
Care must be taken to be realistic about what can be achieved through elite-led negotiations. The
prevailing global economic system has contributed to pressure on government negotiating teams
to yield little in terms of socio-economic change which might deviate from planned economic
programmes. This is particularly true with the homogenisation of neoliberal economic
programmes. With reference to conflicts which have an element of (or are entirely) resource-
based, unjust socio-economic structures which are exacerbated by neoliberal policies are unlikely
to be address~d fully in negotiations. In EI Salvador the fact that the World Bank and IMF were
concerned with ensuring economic stabilisation through structural adjustment contributed to the
exclusion of the government's economic programme from the negotiating agenda.6
This is a crucial lesson to be leamtfor the Colombian process since much attention there continues
to focus on how to bring civilian sectors into negotiations so as to broaden the agenda of discussion
to socio-economic issues. This is a hindrance rather than a help to achieving accords, and creates
unrealistic expectations of what is achievable even if there is broad-based participation. The
same international forces calling for structural adjustment pressurise the Colombian government,
and similarly it is unlikely to yield much in terms of socio-economic concessions during
negotiations. Those who have analysed events in EI Salvador and Colombia widely consider the
FMLN to be a much more legitimate force than the Colombian guerrillas. The FMLN had arisen
with support from broad sectors of the population, evidenced by the mass-based fronts which
were the support base for the corresponding guerrilla groups which composed the FMLN.7 The
Colombian guerrillas, on the other hand, never had a broad degree of support from the population
in general, except perhaps briefly during the 1970s with the arrival of the M-19 urban guerrillas
who engaged in daring stunts to engage the interest of the population in general.8 In more recent
years the legitimacy of the Colombian guerrillas has been damaged by their means of raising
money for the armed struggle - drugs production, kidnapping and extortion.
Even taking into consideration the wider legitimacy of the Salvadorean guerrillas, through elite-
led negotiations the FMLN was only able to establish the rules of engagement for democratic
practice and discussion of socio-economic issues in the future. Since the Colombian guerrillas
are considered a less legitimate force, it is unlikely that they will be able to achieve more.9 If it
can be accepted that elite-led negotiations will be of a limited nature, then energy which would
have been channelled into these negotiations will be released. This energy could then be channelled
into the search for alternative ways to contribute to peacebuilding.
Conflict resolution theory was born in the context of the ending of the Second World War. At
this point maintaining degrees of security between nation states, reflected by attempts to bring
nations together under the banner of the United Nations, was a priority. This contributed to the
focus of one stream of the theory around elite-led negotiations, the purpose of which has been to·
bring an end to war and violence in the context of the international system. This approach takes
a realist perspective to conflict resolution. Third party intervention is employed to help (or coerce)
parties to move towards a negotiated settlement, usually of a bellicose stage of conflict. Those
working with this viewpoint are termed the settlement school (Bloomfield 1995).
The other stream of conflict resolution takes the viewpoint that settlement is not enough, and
that one needs to get to the underlying causes and issues in a conflict situation in order to resolve
it. Third parties in this case are employed to facilitate understanding and communication; the
assumption being that once psychological obstacles to resolution are removed, parties will be
able to come to some mutually agreed outcomes which address their needs and the conflict
issues. This is the resolution school of conflict resolution. Bloomfield (1995) has highlighted the
dichotomy in the conflict resolution literature between these two perspectives, but argues that
there is no need for them to be mutually exclusive.
This paper argues that neither the settlement nor the resolution approach is adequate for the
types of conflict we see emerging in the post-cold war period. It is no longer so easy to distinguish
two well-defined actors with whom one can work to try and facilitate communication and
understanding. 10 Colombia, where there are multiple violent actors, is a classic case in point, and
there, as elsewhere, it is generally the case that the voice of those most affected by the violence
is the least heard in any considerations of how to bring about 'peace'. Whilst the case for a multi-
dimensional approach to peacebuilding has been made inthe conflict resolution literature, little
attention has been given to structural factors which can inhibit the effectiveness of such
approaches. IIWhilst I am not arguing that conflict resolution should, or indeed has the capacity
to 'take on' all of the structural factors which contribute to the emergence of violent conflict, I
do believe that conflict resolution work at all levels of society should keep awareness high of the
structural causes which contribute to the conditions in which many people live in southern
countries.
This is important for at least four reasons. First, as the social, economic and political dynamics
of societies change, so too will the issues, actors and interests in conflict situations (Vayrynen
1991). If conflict resolution operates with no regard for these changing dynamics it will be
unlikely to have the desired effect, whether at a national or local level. Conversely, maintaining
awareness of surrounding contexts will help keep aims of what can be achieved realistic. Second,
ignoring structure presents the danger that conflict resolution training at a local level will
exclusively focus on giving people the capacity to deal with violence only insofar as it directly
affects them. Doing this, with no exploration of where the violence came from, is but one step
away from blaming these people for the violence, structural and otherwise, which surrounds
them. Third, .if conflict resolution aims merely at controlling violence, without taking into
consideration the context in which that violence occurs, there is a danger that it will have the
effect of reinforcing unjust social, economic and political structures which have contributed to
violent conflict arising in the first place. There is a danger, then, that conflict resolution work
will be merely palliative, or indeed that it will be co-opted into unjust systems. Many communities
in Colombia are suspicious of a Community Justice Programme implemented by the government
for precisely this reason. They believe that the government is trying to control levels of community
violence whilst doing little to address the underlying causes which led to violence in the first
place.12
Prioritising agency to the detriment of structure in conflict resolution literature has been explored
by Jabri. She points to the orthodoxy in conflict resolution literature which regards the individual
decision-maker as the primary unit of analysis, where this individual is 'a purposive agent capable
of making choices according to rationalist criteria' (Jabri 1995: 56). Jabri believes that a focus
solely on agency is insufficient, and that:
the resolution of any conflict, whether it be intercommunal or international conflict,
must be analyzed as a situated process located within the structural properties of
patterned social systems. (Jabri 1995: 53)
Jabri is particularly concerned with power and the effect asymmetrical power relations have on
possibilities for conflict resolution. This brings us to a fourth reason for keeping awareness of
context high in conflict resolution work. Where unequal power relations exist, conflict resolution
techniques leading towards negotiations are unlikely to be of much use. If we reconsider the
main argument here, that elite-led negotiations are limited in what they can achieve, negotiations
of an elite nature are hardly an appropriate place for low-power groups to try and change the
structural conditions in which they live. In these cases empowerment for low-power groups is
likely to be a necessary precondition to meaningful negotiations. 13 Moreover, approaching conflict
resolution with an understanding of structure will also aid understanding of why and how
asymmetrical power relations have emerged.
If it is accepted that elite-led negotiations are limited, then we must look elsewhere for approaches
which can contribute to the wider process of peacebuilding. It is suggested here that there is
value in exploring the notion of empowerment work and its significance for peacebuilding; How ..
is empowerment to occur and what does it really mean?
Rowlands (1995) points out that the meaning of empowerment relates to the model of power
being assumeCl by the user. The most common models used to explore power are 'power over' ,
'power to' and power as discourse or 'de-centred power'. The first of these interprets power as
something finite, it is about one individual or group exercising domination over another, a zero
sum approach. 'Power to' is more concerned with power as generative and dependant on
relationships, something which can stimulate others into action, which can persuade and open
up new possibilities. This is closest to Foucault's (1980) idea of power as diffuse, limitless and
plural, as opposed to zero sum. Nelson and Wright point to how Ferguson followed Foucault to
evolve the 'de-centred' model of power. With this model, 'power is not a substance possessed
and exercised by any person or institution conceived of as a 'powerful' subject. Power is subjectless
and is an apparatus consisting of discourse, institutions, actors and a flow of events.' (Nelson
and Wright 1995: 9-10)14
If power is everywhere, if every individual capable of acting upon the actions of
others (including when resisting) has power, it becomes quite difficult to account for
the imbalances of power relations between particular groups of people (Rowlands
1995: 20).
I would agree with Rowland's analysis and argue that it is most useful to think of power as
consisting of a mixture of the existing power models. In order to access decision-making,
individuals need to be psychologically aware of their capacity to take more control over their
lives, and they need to realise that power can be found at all levels of social interaction, even in
the smallest ways. But this is not enough. Once action has been generated, a degree of control, or
'power over' is necessary, if access to political decision-making is to be assured.
Why is access to political decision-making important for peacebuilding? If conflict resolution
work has kept awareness of surrounding context high, as suggested earlier, then low-power
groups will often become aware of the need to challenge those structures if the quality of their
lives is to improve. According to Adam Curle (1981), awareness is at the root of all change, and
is indeed the very source of peace. In Latin America much of the thinking about awareness has
sprung from Freire's (1972) idea of conscientisation .With reference to his work with illiterate
adults in the North East of Brazil, Freire believed that literacy programmes ought additionally to
increase awareness and lead the participants to question their oppression. Once people became
fully aware of their reality through the consciousness-raising which could be implemented in
literacy programmes, they would act upon that awareness and challenge existing power
arrangements.
John Paul Lederach is one author in the conflict resolution field who has already explored the
implications of empowerment for peacebuilding. Lederach (1992) neatly draws attention to how
the Spanish language gives. us insight into empowerment. In searching for a title to a year long
series of workshops in Costa Rica, the best Lederach and his co-workers could come up with
was Capacitaci6n Social, or Social Training. However, as Lederach points out, the word 'training
'hardly encapsulates everything- that was going on in the workshop situation. Capacitaci6n has
its roots in capaz, to be capable, or able, soy capaz, and puedo are two ways of saying "I can."
Puedo is conjugated from the verbpoder, which in its noun form means power. Lederach concludes
that their workshop ought to have been called "Social Empowerment."
However, in the Costa Rican context, empowerment went far beyond individuals moving from
'I can't' to 'I can.' There, the people felt it was also very closely tied up with confianza or trust,
and that 'empowerment of selfwas,intimately wrapped up with empowerment of others through
creating community.' Moreover, 'empowerment involves mutual dependence. 'I can' is only
fully accomplished with 'I need you" (1992: 11). Lederach draws from this example to argue
that peacemaking must value both the individual empowerment process, but also that which
feeds back into the community. It is the latter which then allows us to address systemic change.
I would join with Lederach in arguing that internal, personal awareness and empowerment have
to lead to community awareness and empowerment if the challenging of structures is to be
possible. If peacebuilding is to be concerned with challenging structures, it requires empowerment
of both the individual and the community. Work to raise people's consciousness must be followed
by training in, and support for, ways to become more self-reliant and have more control over
local development. If empowerment is limited to the self, there will be no structure on which to
build the political participation which is necessary to confront structural inequalities, whether as
means to change those structures, or merely to forge open more spaces in which to make a
minimal difference.
1.5 Structural Development from the Grassroots as a Peacebuilding Strategy
The experiences of El Salvador and Colombia suggest that issues pertaining to structural
development need to be addressed in spheres outside elite-led negotiations. The relationship
between conflict resolution and sustainable peacebuilding through development work has
remained largely un-addressed in the conflict literature.' Burton's human needs theory certainly
draws attention to developmental needs, but the idea of how to address them within conflict
resolution is stilllimitedto the assumption that once a negotiating stage has been reached (through
official or non-official channels), it will be possible to bring these needs onto the agenda, and
indeed 'resolve' them.
Edward Azar (1990) provides the exception tothe rule when he argues forcibly that any conflict
resolution strategy must be one which addresses processes of underdevelopment. Azar focuses
on the need for development diplomacy and external assistance at the international level. The
limitations of relying on external forces to foster internal change are that certainly at the state
level, intervention, diplomacy and development aid can be so highly politically skewed. States,
and development agencies working under the auspices of states, usually intervene to serve their
own interests which may well be incongruent with those of ordinary people in the recipient
country.
Alger (1987) sees new creative methods of contributing to peacebuilding emerging from the
grassroots, in both the 'third world' and in pockets of poverty in industrialised countries. He
argues that these movements are challenging the meaning of development, a development which
for them has much more to do with self-determination, although not in the sense of state-building.
Crucial to this type of development is the idea that the starting point for strategies ought to be the
context in which the development is to take place. These strategies ought to seek solutions in the
setting and not outside it, and should use resources available at the local level. Alger argues that
inherent in this new kind of development is the capacity to mobilise new potential for solving
the problems of violent conflict. Part 2 of this paper evaluates to what extent Alger's optimism
regarding the potential peacebuilding capacity of grassroots development is reflected through
rural and urban peace-building processes in Colombia.
Part 2 - The Theory Grounded
2.1 The Experience of the ATCC: Local Development Becomes a Threat to
Structures of Power
A much admired experience of peacebuilding in Colombia is that of a community called La
India in the Magdalena Medio, one of the most violent zones in the country.ISLa India is composed
of peasant colonisers who carne to the region, pushing back the agricultural frontier, and hoping
to eke out a living on the fertile land surrounding the River Carare. Typical of such zones in
Colombia is a lack of state presence and the area, surrounding La India is no exception. In the
mid-1960s the FARC guerrillas arrived and from then on violence became a significant part of
the community's everyday existence. The violence grew in intensity through the 1980s,
culminating with the army's promotion of paramilitary groups (originally peasant self-defence
groups) from the mid-1980s onwards.
The initial spark which persuaded the community of La India to confront the surrounding violence
was the attempt by a paramilitary group to create a so-called 'self-defence' organisation within
the community itself. As told by one of the peasants from the community:
Paramilitary groups forced us to attend meetings and gave us four choices: either we
join the guerrillas, we unite with them in their struggle against the guerrillas, we
leave the area or we die (Oswaldo Peron, author's interview)
Instead of opting for one of these. choices, the peasants decided to confront all of the violent
forces and initiated a series of meetings with them. During the meetings the peasants put forward
their own demands. In the first one with the guerrillas the following demands were made:
1. Not one more peasant would be shot by the guerrillas
2. Not one more service would be provided for the guerrillas - no more food,
favours or transport
3. No more orders or conditions would be accepted from the guerrillas
4. There would be no more guerrilla visits to the peasants' houses, nor any more
political meetings (Sanz de Santamaria 1990: 2)
With these meetings the ATCC (Association of Peasants and Workers of the Carare Region) was
born. The courage of the peasants in confronting the guerrillas, army and paramilitaries was
acknowledged on all sides. Against all odds and expectations these violent forces were persuaded
to stop targeting civilians in the area. The ATCC grew in strength and number from 1987-1990.
It maintained a constant dialogue process with all of the violent actors, mediated internal conflicts
which arose in the community, and travelled up and down the river Carare to outlying settlements,
promoting the ideals of the organisation and ensuring that the violent actors kept their promises
throughout the zone which came under La India's influence. 16
What are the key factors which explain the success of the ATCC in reducing the levels of violence
in and around about the community of La India? One of the predominant factors which the
people of the community identify is th~ fact that solutions were sought by those who experienced
the violence, hot by outsiders sweeping in to prescribe remedies:
You know that illness which is not treated at its roots never goes away. What you
have to do is work- from the very bottom where the roots of a problem are found,
there is no point in starting from above then working down ... It is not the same me
having lived 30 or 40 years in this land trying to work out how to approach the
question of peace, to you or any other person coming in from outside to talk of
peace .... This is probably what has helped us begin to approach peace,here ..,the fact
that we, the people affected by the violence, got involved in trying to find a solution
(Manuel Serna, author's interview) I?
The ATCC's vision of peace seems absolutely crucial. For them, peace was much more than the
absence of violence, and included well-articulated ideas on socio-economic development. 18 The
ATCC trusted in non-violent methods of action, and believed whole-heartedly in the power of
dialogue. This dialogue was based on acknowledgement of their adversaries, and forgiveness
rather than revenge. Furthermore, the community was convinced of the need to encourage non-
violent means of dealing with conflict from the earliest possible point, and was dedicated to the
elaboration of education programmes to encourage this, and also to encourage students to remain
in the countryside.
Based only on this description, the experience of the ATCC would seem to fully endorse the idea
that development and peacebuilding work can be highly effective if promoted from 'below'.
However, what subsequently happened to the peacebuilding process which they initiated suggests
that, just as for elite-led negotiations, care must be taken not to overestimate what can be achieved
at this level.
One of the great paradoxes of the experience of the ATCC is the fact that the comprehensive
nature of its vision of peace probably contributed to its downfall. When the alternative socio-
economic development schemes began to show that they could be viable, make a profit, and
empower the community economically, the whole process became a threat to the local systems
of power. The clientelist system endemic in the Colombian countryside, whereby economic or
other favours are offered to 'clients' in exchange for votes, could not be reconciled with peasants
gaining control over their own future. On the 26th February 1990, the three leaders of the ATCC
were murdered (along with a journalist investigating the role of the ATCC in promoting peace).
Whilst there have been many differing interpretations of the reasons for the murders, including
speculation that the leaders of the ATCC were about to broadcast names of paramilitaries who
had committed atrocities in the past, this author believes that peasant empowerment becoming a
threat to the entrenched system must be a part of the explanation.19
Some of the problems in which the ATCC became embroiled subsequent to the murders of the
three original'leaders are common to many popular organisations in Colombia and elsewhere.
The ATCC began to lose clarity of aims and objectives. Protagonistic tendencies began to exclude
people and the degree of unity which had existed between the Association and the population in
general dramatically declined.20 Some people close to the process believe it lost the original aim
of public order and became more like a business. International attention, including international
prizes. which the ATCC won, may have. brought prestige, but it also encouraged.the leadership of
the association to believe that they were the exclusive 'owners' of the peace process, reducing
their willingness to coordinate work with others.21 There were no evaluatory mechanisms built
into the organisation's structure and limited means of assessing the relative success or failure of
different ways of working. This was partly due to a lack of willingness to undergo any kind of
self-criticism.
If we measure the success of such a process entirely on the variable of a reduction in levels of
direct violence, then the work of the ATCC has undoubtedly been a great success and has provided
a unique illustration of what can be achieved from 'below' in the midst of great adversity.
Nevertheless, whilst violence is not immediately apparent, certainly on a surface level,
undercurrents can definitely be felt in the area. Community members have been threatened again.
Those in outlying areas who used to trust in the ATCC to provide them with security are now
once again forming allegiances with different violent groups which they felt gave them security
in the past. The alternative economic programmes have stagnated over the past five years, and
although the ATCC still has a mandate to employ teachers in the zone, little work is going into
forms of non-violent education.
The process of deterioration of the ATCC's work is not irreversible. Much of what was originally
achieved rested on the clarity of vision and dynamism of the ATCC's first president, Josue
Vargas. If someone can be found now, with similar qualities, then there is a chance that some of
the success of the past can be recaptured. Nevertheless, cynics might suggest that the reason the
ATCC has been left alone, and violence has not returned in its most acute form, is precisely
because it has been ineffectual in promoting the conditions for the implementation of a broader
definition of peace. Such conditions would include empowering forms of socio-economic
development. Key questions remain: can local forms of promoting dialogue and peace work in
the context of continuing surrounding violent realities? If the ATCC does manage to promote
altemative,autonomous forms of development again, will it be left alone to pursue those goals? .
Can empowerment be. significant even if it does not manage to challenge pervading.structural.
realities?
If organisation of the peasants of the ATCCwaspartly a response to an absence of state presence
in the Colombian countryside, the vigilante groups ormilicias of Medellin arose partly in response
to the absence of state presence in the poor urban districts of the city. In a study of the militias
,Jaramillo (1994) points. out that. this:absence~wasmostdeeply felt with respect to the rule of law.
The' police were corrupt and ineffectuaL and no state entity was capable of mediating conflicts
and disputes in the poor districts. The violence grew particularly acute with the arrival of drugs
on the scene in the 1980s. Sicarios or contract killers hired from gangs roaming the poorest
districts became the predominant means to eliminate the enemy. Jaramillo argues that the sicario
. and gang phenomenon contributed to the breakdown of kinship and other ties which were
predominant among neighbours in the poor districts before the 1980s.22
Initially the work of the militias revolved around clearing the poor neighbourhoods of the worst
perpetrators of gang violence, predominantly those who targeted people within the communities
in which they lived. According to the testimony of one of the militia leaders, they grew to be like
a state within a state:
We were the ones who regulated commerce in the poor districts. We regulated the
transport. We mediated disputes. Those between neighbours, those to do with tenants
and landlords. We fulfilled a function that really belonged to the state. But the state
never had any kind of presence in these zones. We came to be the only force that had
any legitimacy (James Urrego, author's interview, 1995).23
Towards the end of 1993, in an attempt to generate alternative means of ensuring security for
their communities, some of the militia groups decided to enter into negotiations with the
government. Partly, this was a result of fragmentation within the militia. The members had little
political formation and often a lack of ideological direction. There was internal fighting and
some had turned to criminality to raise funds for their operations. In so doing, they became
involved in the very acts which they purported to eradicate. The militias themselves recognised
the problems they had in graduating from being concerned exclusively with the elimination of
gangs and public security, to having the capacity to both organise and politicise the communities
and attend to their social and economic needs. James Urrego:
A moment arrived in which we had to generate cohesive proposals before the
communities and really, at that moment in time, we didn.'t have them ... The primary _
objective of the negotiations with the government was to achieve social investment in
the communities (author's interview, 1995).
The negotiating processes of the Medellin militias have· useful lessons to teach us about how
development and empowerment can most effectively be approached through local-level
negotiations. There were two distinct negotiating processes, one with the Independent Militias
of the Abumi Valley (MPVA), the· other with a group called the Popular Militias of and for the
People (MPP), which negotiated along withtwo smaller groups, the Independent Militias (MI)
and the Metropolitan Militias (MM).
The'negotiations involvingthe'MPV Amilitias had a good deal0f support and participation from
the community in which the militias ..operated. A working group was established.and the
community was consulted when important decisions had to be made. The agreements reached
from the negotiations included plans for local development, for the consolidation of community
organisations and for gestares de paz, or peace promoters, which were both ex-militias and
community members. Subsequent to the accords a local conflict resolution centre was established
in the district of Moravia / El Bosque, where community leaders and a handful of ex-militias
now mediate conflicts. The centre has been a success and has provided the blueprint for a similar
centre in another district, Andalucfa.24
In contrast, the negotiations with the MPP, MI and MM focused around the creation of a security
cooperative, Coosercom. The idea behind Coosercom was that the militias would keep their
arms and continue to provide security for their districts, but would become a legal entity. A
support group of community members was also formed for this process. Nevertheless, within
this support group, a number of people still wished the militias to perform a vigilante role in the
community. This impeded the development of the support group and it disintegrated (Arias &
Medina 1995).
There are a number of fundamental flaws behind the creation of Coosercom which have
contributed to the problems experienced. First, there is the underlying assumption that private
security is an acceptable substitute for state security in some of the most abandoned areas in both
rural and urban Colombia.25 Whilst Coosercom has not taken on the characteristics of paramilitary
groups, it has, in some of the areas in which it operates, become a law unto itself. Community
members have complained of revenge killings and reprisals as a result of conflicts dating from
before the militias became a legal entity.26
Second, there is the ill-conceived idea that peace and security will be engendered through the
use of arms by a group of poorly-trained youngsters who have a reputation for resorting to arms
to solve all problems. Initially conceived as a small force carefully monitored by the community,
in the end result Coosercom was composed of 350 members which represented ten per cent of
the police foice in the city. In contrast to the ten months training in a police academy for the
normal police force, the Coosercom members received only emergency training, and a third of
the salaryY The lack of training and ,follow-up procedures by the government make the
cooperative's internal problems hardly surprising. James Urrego:
We had,some difficulties to do with the change in mentality of some of our members.
They had- been working aLthe margins of the law and suddenly had to adapt to
working within the legitimate Constitution. This is not something that can be achieved
overnight. It is something which requires education and a new kind of formation,
one which could change the presiding mentality that conflicts ought to be resolved
through the use of arms (author's interview, 1995).
The problems experienced by Coosercom were also due to the fact that the number of ex-militias
to benefit from the Accords had been artificially inflated. On the one hand, the militias believed
that with higher numbers they would have more strength in the negotiating process, on the other,
members of ordinary criminal gangs wanted to benefit from the financial and legal elements of
the Accords. According to a former leader of Coosercom who participated in the negotiations,
the number of genuine ex-militias did not reach more than 120.Within two years of its inauguration
at least one third of Coosercom members were dead or in j ail as a result of internal struggles for
power, position, and control of territory and arms (Costello 1996).
It is difficult not to adhere to the idea that in Coosercom the state saw a cheap option to provide
security for the most violent parts of the most violent city in the country. The negotiating process
was hurried through with little time for proper consideration of the demands of such a project.
Alonso Salazar, a respected social scientist from Medellin argues:
This government believes that peace processes finish with the signing of accords. It
seems to me that this is the moment when the real process begins. The government
has left its peace process with the militias unprotected in the sense that it hasn't
developed accompanying strategies to assist the process of bringing the militias back
into civilian life, in economic, social and human terms. We all know that this was a
particularly important part of this process, especially for the militias who were
involved. These were a group of, for the most part, adolescent boys, with low academic
ability and low political formation, who were brought up in extremely confrontational
environments (Alonso Salazar, quoted in Costello & Bonilla 1995a).
In view of Coosercom's failure to provide security - and the fact that the organisation itself had
become part of the problem .•in 1996 a process of disarming Coosercom members began. However,
members are afraid that if they give up all of their arms they will be left in a highly vulnerable
position. These fears seem justified in light of past experience and the fact that Coosercom's
leader, James,Urrego, was murdered in October 1996.
The key differences between the negotiating experiences of the militias of Medellin are that in
the case of the MPVA militias the community was involved, and together the militias and
community began to look for alternative means of solving conflicts. In the case of the MPP, MI
and MM, violence and the use of arms continued to be seen as an appropriate response to conflict.
. The degree .ofsuccess of the .strategies can be seen by.the fact that,.in.the latter case, social
investment in certain communities increased, butthe levels of violence were hardly affected. In
the case of the MPVA militias, on the other hand, social investment ran into problems and was
practically insignificant in the end, but attitudes towards conflict and violence have at least been
addressed and, according to some estimates, criminality and violence actually decreased by 80
per cent (Costello 1995).
The lessons from these experiences suggest that one of the keys to peacebuilding from 'below'
must be education to change norms of violence in communities.28 An education that encourages
people to talk through their differences and better understand each other's point of view, rather
than to use violence as an immediate response to problems, would seem to be a crucial means of
increasing tolerance and contributing to a more peaceful environment. The success of the work
in the conflict resolution centre in Moravia / EI Bosque would support this view. There is therefore
a decisive role for conflict resolution training and techniques at this 10callevel.29 Nevertheless,
such an approach will not work if the state and other powerful entities continue to promote
solutions which utilise arms and violence to deal with conflict.
We are left with the question of whether the negotiating processes with the Medellin militias
could be considered 'empowering' from the militias' and the communities' point of view. In one
sense the experience of Coosercom may have been empowering for the communities in which it
operated, because community 'representatives' gained legal control of public security. However,
this was a very fragile empowerment which was unable to maintain spaces from which the
community could build its own political participation. The limited empowerment of certain
individuals did not feed back into the community and therefore the entire Coosercom process
was unable to address systemic change. In contrast, the MPVA negotiations which enhanced the
role of peace promoters were more successful in forging open a minimal space in which the
community could have more control over its own future development.
Whilst recognising the limitations to elite-led, track-one level negotiations, care must be taken
not to assume that peacebuilding efforts and negotiations undertaken at other levels will necessarily
be more effective. The experiences of the ATCC and the inilitias in Medellin show that structural
conditions surroundingpeacebuilding still affect-what can be achieved at the local level. The
ATCC arose in response~toco,..option by military forces, repression and human rights abuse
perpetrated by these forces, clientelism and political manipulation. Whilst successful for a time
in staving off these coercive elements there-is a very real danger that they will-return to completely
erode theATCC's autonomy-andpeacebuildingcapacity. The militias arose as a means not only
to reduce violence in the poor districts in Medellin, but also to try to forge open spaces so that the
communities could participate in political, economic and social life. Whilst limited achievements
have been made, such as a reduction in the violence in the community where the MPVA negotiated,
it is hard to see how these can survive in the long-term. States which insist on maintaining
exclusionary political and economic strategies, such as the criminalisation of social protest and
neoliberal policies which erode the capacity of the base of society to participate in economic life,
make it difficult to be optimistic for long-term success.3D
We are left with the question: are development, empowerment and peace-building from 'below'
useful and relevant concepts? One of the crucial elements in the local-level negotiations of the
ATCC and the MPVA militias in Medellin was the fact that the communities began to feel that
collectively they could contribute to, and help determine, the shape of their surroundings in the
future. The communities felt empowered through organisational processes which made them
feel that they had more control over their own lives, but that does not necessarily mean that they
gained something in terms of a possession. Viewing empowerment in this way, as process, gets
us away from trying to measure it in relation to something else, for example, in relation to state
power. Empowerment as an end in itself can therefore be seen as a meaningful objective, as
indeed can the process of striving towards peace. Whilst it may seem that the extent to which
development, empowerment and peacebuilding from 'below' can impact on structures is very
limited, particularly in the long-term, viewing these variables in terms of process makes them
meaningful in themselves. If we prioritise the process of struggling towards a goal, we are more
likely to maintain long-term commitment to that goal. This is because we do not so easily become
disillusioned the longer the process takes to achieve results.
Over a year of fieldwork in EI Salvador and Colombia I was consistently amazed by the tenacity
and optimism of people struggling to maintain meaningful peacebuilding processes in the midst
of extremely violent circumstances. Their determination never to lose sight of the validity of
process has much to teach academics and those most involved with generating theory, who tend
to become frustrated the longer process takes to achieve concrete results. As indicated by Sanz
de Santamaria (1990), we have much to learn from ordinary communities which do not separate
the generation of theory from practice ...Rather; through, interactive processes of reflection and
action, they respond to· violence:in ways which they feel most appropriate. They are therefore
recognising that their own form of knowledge generation is valid, which isa crucial step towards
persuading others thatit is,valid.3l
Indigenous, grassroots ..responses. to violence may not always achieve the desirable results, but ..
they are likely to be more suitable than responses generated from 'above'. After all, these people
have to live with the consequences of their actions. In 1987 the peasants of the ATCC saw a
means to confront their reality in a way in which no academic or politician would have considered
possible. We must have the courage to let go of pre-conceived ideas of what the nature of
peacebuilding should be, and learn what we can from experiences of peace building from 'below'.
In so doing we may be able to playa useful role in disseminating information and contributing to
the formation of relevant strategies and responses for other grassroots organisations confronted
with challenges similar to those of the ATCC and the cormnunities of Medellin.
1. Accords in Colombia have been signed between the government and the April 19 Movement (M-19), the
Popular Liberation Army (EPL) , the Ernesto Rojas Commands (CER), the Worker's Revolutionary Party
(PRT), the Movement of Socialist Renovation (CRS- dissident ELN guerrillas); the Quintin Lame indigenous
group, the Francisco Garnica Front and the militias (vigilante groups) of Medellin.
Peacebuilding from 'below' is both a practice and a perspective. In practice it means peacebuilding engaged
in at the local level by those who live in the midst of violent realities. The perspective presents the idea that
those most affected by violence, who understand it and have to live with its consequences, will be best placed
to find appropriate solutions to it. Outsiders engaged in peacebuilding endeavours may enter regions of conflict
and propose ideas to help deal with its violent manifestations. Nevertheless, they must be sensitive to resources
available at the local level, particularly the wealth of experience and knowledge of people living in the area.
4. Civil here is used to mean actors which operate nominally outside'the state, although they may bear influence
on state actors and vice versa. It also means non-military actors. In Colombia it is not universally accepted
that :civil' means 'non-military'. Some argue that armed actors such as paramilitary groups and the guerrillas-
are in fact' armed expressions of"civilsociety' (GarcfaDunin 1995; Garcia Pefia 1995, author's interview).
Whilst accepting;thatviolent methods may well be supported and encouraged financially and in other ways by
civil sectors;ithis argument'distorts the essentially non-military character oLwhatis termed 'civil' .It alsofails,.·
to acknowledge the' choice that certainciviLsectors,have taken to fightin a non-violent, non-military, fashion.
5, There is no space in,thispaperto explorefully thefailure,of attempts toJoster civilian participation, in negotiating,
processes in Colombia and El Salvador. These are examined in separate chapters in my forthcoming PhD
Thesis, 'Peacebuilding from 'Below': A Comparative Analysis ofEl Salvador and Colombia.'
6. De Soto and del Castillo (1994) point to the lack of transparency in the Salvadorean negotiations between the
UN on the one hand and the Bretton Woods institutions on the other. Whilst the latter were more concerned
with insuring economic stabilisation through structural adjustment, the UN was most concerned with the form
and detail of the peace accords. The lack of transparency between the institutions meant that little attention
was paid to the dichotomy between the finance needed for the full implementation of the peace accords and the
constraints of structural adjustment policies which limited domestic funds.
7. The mass-based fronts were the United Popular Action Front (FAPU), the Popular Revolutionary Block (BPR)
and the Popular Leagues-28 (LP-28)". These brought together rural and urban expressions of discontent, trade
unions, student and peasant organisations. In 1980 the fronts came together to form the Revolutionary
Coordinator of Masses (CRM). The five component parts of the FMLN were the Popular Liberation Forces
(FPL) , the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP) , the Armed Forces of National Resistance (FARN) , the
Communist Party (PC) and the Central American Revolutionary Worker's Party (PRTC).
8. One such stunt was the theft of Simon Bolivar's sword from a museum in Bogota. Bolivar liberated Colombia
from the Spanish in the 18th century and therefore has a great significance in national history.
9. The guerrilla groups which remain in arms in Colombia - the FARC, ELN and dissident EPL guerrillas - argue
that the limited negotiating agendas of the past are due to the lack of military and political power of the
previous groups negotiating. They believe themselves to be in a much stronger position and so demand
negotiations with a broader agenda and scope, including discussion about socio-economic issues. The
government believes the guerrillas overestimate their strength and what they will be able to bring into
negotiations. Civilian sectors feel that they have a right to be included in negotiations because of the low
degree of legitimacy of the Colombian guerrillas.
10. Rupesinghe (1994) has identified the nature of some of these multiple characters: state-sponsored or state-
condoned death squads; vigilante committees; insurgents; mercenaries and/or criminals; wealthy, well-armed
and well-organised drug syndicates which also act as arms merchants, selling weapons to all sides.
11. Fisher and Keashly (1991) in their contingency model suggest that different kinds of third party intervention
ought to be used at different stages in a conflict's progression or escalation. These range from conciliation to
mediation, mediation with muscle, consultation, arbitration and peacekeeping. These ought to be seen as
complementary rather than competing or contradictory, and the stage of escalation of the conflict is the
determining factor on which methodes) ought to be used at any particular time.
12. The idea behind the Community Justice Programme was to move away from criminalising certain lesser
crimes, decongest the justice system, and give communities more autonomy in dealing with their own conflicts.
Instead of recurring to the state justice system, people were encouraged to take their conflicts to extra-judicial
conciliators and peace judges who would use alternative conflict resolution techniques such as mediation,
conciliation, and in the case of the judges, arbitration to try and reach a satisfactory conclusion for all sides.
However, the fact that the state still sponsored the Community Justice Programme meant that people remained
sceptical of its worth. Given the fact that Colombian citizens have become accustomed to a 97 per cent impunity
rate for crimes in general, this is hardly surprising. The Conflict Resolution Centre in a district in Medellin
which is examined later in this paper used some of the principals of the Community Justice Programme.
Nevertheless, the key difference is thatit is the community itself which controls the Conflict Resolution Centre,
and not a state regulatory body.
13. A number of other authors in the conflict resolution field have similarly argued that in order for negotiations to
be viable, and any agreements, reached lasting, there needs to be power balance between adversaries (Curle
1970; Wallensteerrl988, Zartman 1989 & 1995, Van der Merwe et al 1990, Licklider 1990,. Stedman 1991).
c ,:, Jabri takes, this'argument> one: step further: to suggest thatthe mechanisms,fof dealing with, power asymmetries
within conflictresolutioTITemain inadequateseeJabri' 1995,andauthor~s PhD Thesis"chapter. one.,
14. Nelson and Wright refer to Ferguson J., The Anti-Politics Machine, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990.
15. The Association of the community of La India, the ATCC (Association of Workers and Peasants of El Carare),
won the Alternative Nobel Peace Prize in 1990 and the United Nation's 'We the People' award in 1995.
16. La India is acorregimiento, which means a group of settlements which, although geographically far apart, are
considered an administrative unit. The main settlement of the corregimiento is also called La India.
18. In the ATCC's 'Great Dialogue for Peace' held in 1990 detailed plans for the socio-economic development of
the community were elaborated. These included plans for agrarian reform, for technical assistance for agriculture,
for mechanisation of the land, for agro-fishing diversification, for the commercialisation and marketing of
produce and for erosion and pest control. CEDE (Centro de Estudios Sobre Desarrollo Economico Facultad
de Econornia, Universidad de los Andes),lnforme Final Los Procesos de Pazy Desarrollo en EI Corregimiento
de La India: Perfodo Junio de 1989 a Febrero de 1990, Anexo CEDE, March 1990
19. This analysis is shared by interviewees. who prefer to remain anonymous.
20. This was particularly true when the ATCC stopped travelling to other settlements within La India's catchment
area. When the population in these communities began to feel that the ATCC could no longer guarantee their
security, it encouraged them to resort to old allegiances with other groups, such as the guerrillas. In the elections
for the board of the ATCC in 1995, approximately 250 people voted, in 1990 this figure had been around the
2,000 mark.
22. The gang culture in Medellin was exacerbated by the so-called 'Peace Camps' of the M-19 guerrillas. The
camps were created as a result of the 1984 Peace Agreements between President Betancur and the M-19 and
were supposed to provide both military and political training. The emphasis was always on the former. When
the camps closed with the breakdown of the Peace Accords, a lot of youths who had been trained in military
techniques were left. Some chose to join the guerrillas in the countryside, some chose to study, others formed
gangs in the popular districts of the city (Arias & Medina 1995).
23. James Urrego was from the Popular Militias of and for the People (MPP) and was one of the leaders of the
security cooperative, Coosercom, which is examined later. He was murdered in October 1996.
24. Community members have consideredthe Moravia IEl Bosque Conflict Resolution Centre a great success. In
a survey, 96 per cent of people who had used it found solutions to their problems and everyone surveyed said
they would use the centre again (Roldan 1996).
25. Private justice takes various forms in Colombia - so-called 'self-defence' groups, paramilitaries and security
cooperatives like Coosercom. The guerrillas also have their own forms of implementing private justice. The
relationships which each of these have with the state, the army, the police and drugs traffickers differ depending
on the region in which they operate. Paramilitary groups were made illegal by President Barco in 1989, but a
new form of rural security cooperative (self-defence group) called Convivir are now legal and collaborate
with illegal paramilitary groups.
26. This problem is partly due to the fact that whilst Coosercom was initially supposed to keep to the areas in
which its members previously had support, its area of action was expanded to other zones where rival gangs
still operated.
27. Statistics from Costello Paolo & Bonilla Wilfer, Coosercom Cooperativa, 0 Ejercito?, El Colombiano, 26th
May, 1995: 7B
28. An anecdote from Jose Luciano ·Sanfnof the Popular,Training Institute (!PC), anNGO in Medellfn which
supported,the:negotiating process withthe'MPVA militias, illustrates the continuing challenge for the future,
Just before the' opening of the Moravia I El·Bosque ConflictResolution,CentretheJight bulbs, were stolen. The'
community was asked/How should we respond to these. thieves, so that they don't come' in and:steal from us ..
again?' The community response was 'Shoot them: ..
29. Thosewno. work. in, the Conflict Resolution: Centre':in,·Moravia.! El Bosque have. been;, trained ,jn~conflict
resolution techniques by the !PC and by the Colombian Ministry of Justice.
30. By the criminalisation of social protest it is meant that all acts of protest are increasingly considered a criminal
offence. There is a tendency towards this in Colombia. An anti-terrorist statute introduced by President Barco
broadened the definition of terrorism so that ordinary acts of civil disobedience can now be classified as
'terrorist' . The Statute for the Defence of Order, a permanent fixture of Colombia's justice system since 1992,
means that all those accused of being 'terrorists' can be tried under a system of secret justice whereby the
identity of the judge, the prosecution's evidence, witnesses and their testimony are all kept confidential and
inaccessible to the defendant and hislher lawyer.
31. In my forthcoming thesis, I argue that the question of who has power over the process of knowledge generation
is fundamental to the quest of empowerment. I highlight the usefulness of viewing empowerment from the
perspective of the research techniqile Participatory Action Research. (PAR). Empowerment from a PAR
perspective is not only concerned with theprovision of knowledge, but is additionally concerned with recognising
the value of indigenous knowledge production.
Bibliography
Alger, Chadwick F., 'A Grassroots Approach to Life in Peace' ,Bulletin of Peace Proposals, Vol.
18, No 3, 1987: 375-392
Arias, Edgar and Medina, Gilberto, Solucion de Conflictos, Insituto Popular de Capacitacion,
1995
Azar, Edward E, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict Theory and Cases, Dartmouth
Publishing Company Ltd., 1990
. Bloomfield,David; Complementarity in Conflict Management Theory. Strategies for Resolution .
and Settlerrtent fn:the:Northem1reland.; Coriflict:PhD thesis: University of Bradford, 1995
- -CEDE;"lnfor:mefinal EosProcesosrde-Paz.yDesarrollo-en El Corregimiento de-Lalndia"~Periodo ·C-,·-
Junio de 1989 a Febrero-de 1990; CEDE, 1990,.
Costello, Paolo and Bonilla, Wilfer, Coosercom Cooperativa, 0 Ejercito?, El Colombiano, 26th
May, 1995a: 7B
Costello, Paolo and Bonilla, Wilfer, Las disputas internas: una herencia de la ilegalidad, EI
Colombiano, 26th May, 1995b: 7B
Fisher, Ronald J. and Keashly, Loraleigh, 'The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and
Consultation Within a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention', Journal of Peace
Research, Vol. 28, No 1, 1991: 29-42
Foucault, Michel, Power-Knowledge Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977
translated from the French by C. Gordon (ed.), Harvester Press, 1980
Garcia, Duran Mauricio, 'La Sociedad Civil y Los Procesos de Paz en Colombia' in De La
Guerra a La Paz Memorias del Seminario Internacional sobre Negociacion de Conflictos
Armados, Octubre de 1994, CINEP, 1995: 135-144
Jabti, Vivienne, 'Agency, Structure and the Question of Power in Conflict Resolution' ,Paradigms:
The Kent Journal of International Relations, Vol 9, No.2, Winter 1995
Jaramillo, Ana Maria, Milicias Populares en Medellin Entre la Guerra y La Paz, Corporacion
Region, 1994
Lederach, John Paul, Beyond Prescription New Lenses for Conflict Resolution Training Across
Cultures, Working Draft-for Journal of Peace Research, May 1992
Licklider, Roy, Civil Violence and Conflict Resolution: A Frameworkfor Analysis, Paper presented
at Conference on How Civil Wars End, The State University of New Jersey, March 2-4, 1990
Mayo, Marjorie"and. Craig, Gary, (eds), Community, Empowerment A Reader in Participation
and Development, Zed Books, 1995
Nelson;Nici andWright:,'Susan( eds ),PowerandParticipatoryDevelopment Theory and Practice~,
IntermediateTechnology Publications, London 1995
Rowlands, Joanna Mary, Empowerment Examined: An Exploration of the Concept and Practice
of Women s Empowerment in Honduras, PhD Thesis, Durham University, 1995
Roldan, Hernando, Sstematizaci6n de Centro Cmunitario de Resoluci6n de Conciliaci6n de
Cnflictos de los Barrios el Bosque y Moravia, Instituto Popular de Capacitaci6n de la Corporaci6n
de Promoci6n Popular, Medellin, 1996
Rupesinghe, Kumar, 'The Disappearing Boundaries Between Internal and External Conflicts' ,
in Elise Boulding (ed.) New Agendas for Peace Research Conflict and Security Reexamined,
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992: 43-64
Rupesinghe, Kumar, Humanitarian Agencies and Armed Conflict A Discussion Paper,
International Alert, 1994
Stedman, John Stephen, Peacemaking in Civil WarInternational Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974-
1980, Lynne Rienner Publications, Boulder and London, 1991
Sanz de Santamaria, Alejandro, De la violencia y El Empobrecimiento a la Pazy la Reconstruccion
Economica Descripcion del trabajo realizado por laATCC, paper presented in London, December
1990
de Soto, Alvaro and del Castillo, Graciana, 'Obstacles to Peacebuilding', Foreign Policy, Spring
1992, Vol 94: 69-83
Thomas, Alan, 'Non-Governmental Organizations and the Limits to Empowerment' , in Wuyts,
M., Mackintosh, M. and Hewitt, T. (eds),Development Policy & Public Action, Oxford University
Press, 1992
Van der Merwe, H., Maree, J., Zaaiman, A., Philip, C. and Muller, A.D., 'Principles of
Communication Between Adversaries in South Africa' in Burton, John and Dukes, Frank(eds),
Conflict: Readings in Management & Resolution, Macmillan, 1991: 216-240
Vayrynen, Raimo (ed.), New Directions in Conflict Theory Conflict Resolution and Conflict
Transformation, International Social Science Council, Sage Publications, 1991
Wallensteen, Peter, Peace Research Achievements and Challenges, Westview Special Studies in
Peace, Conflict and Conflict Resolution, Westview Press, 1988
Zartman, William, Ripe for Resolution Conflict Intervention inAfrica, Updated Version, A Council
for Foreign Relations Book, Oxford University Press, 1989
Zartman ,William (ed.), Elusive Peace, Negotiating an End to Civil Wars, The Brookings
Instituion, Washington D.C. 1995
